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Context-aware Data Aggregation with Localized
Information Privacy
Bo Jiang, Student Member, IEEE, Ming Li, Senior Member, IEEE and Ravi Tandon, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, localized information privacy (LIP)
is proposed, as a new privacy definition, which allows statistical
aggregation while protecting users’ privacy without relying on
a trusted third party. The notion of context-awareness is incor-
porated in LIP by the introduction of priors, which enables the
design of privacy-preserving data aggregation with knowledge
of priors. We show that LIP relaxes the Localized Differential
Privacy (LDP) notion by explicitly modeling the adversary’s
knowledge. However, it is stricter than 2ǫ-LDP and ǫ-mutual
information privacy. The incorporation of local priors allows
LIP to achieve higher utility compared to other approaches.
For four different applications in privacy-preserving data ag-
gregation, including survey, summation, weighted summation
and histogram, we present an optimization framework, with the
goal of minimizing the mean square error while satisfying the
LIP privacy constraints. Utility-privacy tradeoffs are obtained
under each model in closed-form, we then theoretically compare
with the centralized information privacy and LDP. At last, we
validate our analysis by simulations using both synthetic and
real-world data. Results show that our LIP mechanism provides
better utility-privacy tradeoffs than LDP and when the prior is
not uniformly distributed, the advantage of LIP is even more
significant.
Index Terms—privacy-preserving data aggregation, differential
privacy, information-theoretic privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
PRIVACY issues are crucial in this big data era, as users’data are collected both intentionally or unintentionally by
a large number of private or public organizations. Most of the
collected data are used for ensuring high quality of service, but
may also put one’s sensitive information at potential risk. For
instance, when someone is rating a movie, his/her preferences
may be leaked; when someone is searching for a parking spot
nearby using a smartphone, his/her real location is uploaded
and may be prone to leakage. To mitigate such privacy leakage,
it is desirable to design privacy-preserving mechanisms that
provide strong privacy guarantees without affecting data utility.
Traditional privacy notions such as k-anonymity [2] do not
provide rigorous privacy guarantee and are prone to various
attacks. On the other hand, Differential Privacy (DP) [3], [4]
has become the defacto standard for ensuring data privacy
in the database community [5]. The definition of DP assures
each user’s data has minimal influence on the output of certain
types of queries on a database. In the classical DP setting, it
is assumed that there is a trusted server which perturbs users’
data while answering queries. However, more often then not,
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organization collecting users’ data may not be trustworthy and
the database storage system may not be secure [6].
Recently, localized privacy protection mechanisms have
gained attention as this setting allows local data aggregation
while protecting each user’s data without relying on a trusted
third party [7]. In localized privacy-preserving data release,
each user perturbs his or her data before uploading it; or-
ganizations that want to take advantage of users’ data then
aggregate with collected users’ published results. Earliest
such mechanism is randomized response [8], which randomly
perturbs each user’s data. However, the original randomized
response does not have formal privacy guarantees. Later,
Localized Differential Privacy (LDP) was proposed as a local
variant of DP that quantifies the privacy leakage in the local
setting [9]. Many schemes were proposed under the notion of
LDP. For example, [10]–[12], and Google’s RAPPOR [13].
LDP based data aggregation mechanisms have already been
deployed in the real-world. For example, in June 2016, Apple
announced that it would deploy LDP-based mechanisms to
collect user’s typing data [14]. However, Tang et al. show that
although each user’s perturbation mechanism satisfies LDP,
the privacy budget is too large (ǫ = 43)1 to provide any
useful privacy protection. Wang et al. provide a variety of
LDP protocols for frequency estimation [15] and compare their
performance with Google’s RAPPOR. However, for a given
reasonable privacy budget, these protocols provide limited
utility. Intuitively, compared with the centralized DP model, it
is more challenging to achieve a good utility-privacy tradeoff
under the LDP model. The main reasons are two-fold: (1) LDP
requires introducing noise at a significantly higher level than
what is required in the centralized model. That is, a lower
bound of noise magnitude of Ωǫ(
√
N) is required for LDP,
where N is the number of users. In contrast, only Oǫ(1) is
required for centralized DP [16]. (2) LDP does not assume a
neighborhood constraint on users’ data as inputs, thus when
the domain of data is very large, LDP leads to a significantly
reduced utility [17].
In general, both localized and centralized DP provide strong
context-free theoretical guarantees against worst-case adver-
saries [18]. Context-free means that there is no knowledge
of users’ data (either instantaneous or statistical). On the
other hand, context-aware privacy notions such as ones where
statistical knowledge is available are favorable, as the util-
ity can be increased by explicitly modeling the adversary’s
knowledge. Information-theoretic privacy notions [19] [20]
1The parameters, ǫ ≥ 0, measures the privacy level. A smaller ǫ corre-
sponds to a higher privacy level.
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that incorporate statistical (prior) knowledge fall into this
category, which use mutual information (MI) to measure the
information leaked about the original database in the released
data [21]–[23]. Compared with context-free privacy notions,
context-aware privacy notions, especially prior-aware notions
achieve a better utility-privacy tradeoff [18].
We next discuss a simple illustrative example to motivate
the need and advantages of context-aware privacy notions.
Example 1. Consider taking a survey over N = 100 individu-
als, where each person is independently asked whether he/she
has been infected by some kind of disease. It is known based on
clinical studies that this disease infects 1 out of 10 people on
average. Each individual holds a local true answer Xi, where
i is the individual’s index and Xi = 1 if his/her answer is yes,
Xi = 0 if the answer is no. For privacy consideration, each
individual perturbs his/her data by a randomized response
mechanism (shown in Fig. 1) before publishing it. The goal is
to estimate the aggregate
∑N
i=1Xi based on Yi, i = 1, ..., N .
iX iY 
 q
 q
p
 p
Fig. 1. Randomized response mechanism for each individual.
We first assume that the perturbation mechanism satisfies
the context-free ǫ-LDP for a given privacy budget ǫ. By the
definition of LDP, for each user: max{ p1−q , q1−p , 1−qp , 1−pq } ≤
ǫ. In [15], each user’s input Xi is treated as a fixed instance
and a pair of valid solution for (p, q) is p = q = 1eǫ+1 . Using
the unbiased estimator adopted in [15], the expected error of
the aggregate is ELDP = Np(1−p)(p−q)2 = 100e
ǫ
(eǫ+1)2 . The authors
then derived an optimal solution for (p, q) by minimizing this
error while subject to the privacy constraints. Their optimal
values of p and q are different, where q∗ = 1 − eǫ/2
and p∗ = 0.5, resulting in an expected estimation error of
EOpt−LDP = 25(0.5−eǫ/2)2 in our example, which is smaller
than ELDP (as shown in Fig. 2). This approach increases
utility by implicitly using prior knowledge, as it is based on
the fact that the answers of a majority of users are zeros
(q∗ is smaller than p∗). Unfortunately, the assumption that
Xi, i = 1, 2, ..., N are instances rather than random variables
prohibits introducing prior in a principled manner. In addition,
the definition of LDP is independent of the priors, which is
unable to adjust the perturbation parameters based on different
priors. To explicitly introduce prior knowledge, a new privacy
definition is needed.
Assuming that each Xi is a random variable with priors
P1 = Pr(Xi = 1) and P0 = Pr(Xi = 0), we propose a
context-aware LIP notion which imposes a bound on the ratio
between the prior and posterior. In this example, we have:
−ǫ ≤ {Pr(Yi=0)1−q , Pr(Yi=0)q , Pr(Yi=1)1−p , Pr(Yi=1)p } ≤ ǫ. This
notion guarantees that taking observations on the published
data provides limited additional information of the real data.
Restricted by this privacy notion, the optimal p∗ and q∗ which
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Fig. 2. Comparison among the expected estimation error of different
approaches in Example 1: considering prior in the perturbation mechanism
significantly reduces the error.
minimize the mean square error (MSE) can be derived as:
q∗ = P1/e
ǫ and p∗ = P0/e
ǫ. Intuitively, it reduces MSE
by carefully adjusting p and q to different priors. By this
perturbation mechanism, the resulting error is ELIP = 10eǫ−10.64
which is significantly smaller than ELDP (as shown in Fig. 2).
As we discussed above, introducing priors can provide
higher utility. However, this comes at the overhead of esti-
mating or learning prior knowledge. This can be obtained in
two ways: (1) Sometimes, each individual user’s local prior is
available (e.g., can be obtained by training based on historical
published data) [24], [25]. For instance, when Google wants
to survey multiple users’ current locations to construct a
traffic heat-map, it is possible that it already possesses past
reported (unperturbed) locations of each user. (2) However,
local-prior is relatively strong knowledge on users’ data that
may not always be attainable, and one may only be able to
learn a global prior (assuming that users’ data are identically
distributed). For example, when taking a periodic survey,
aggregated results in the recent past can be used as the global
prior. Another example is when estimating the frequency of
a rare disease, one can leverage the results of past clinical
research to obtain a global prior [26].
The main contributions of this paper are three-fold:
(1) We propose a new notion of Localized Information
Privacy (LIP) for the local data release setting (without a
trusted third party), which relaxes the notion of LDP by
introducing priors to increase data utility. We formally show
that, ǫ-LIP implies ǫ-Mutual Information Privacy (MIP), and
ǫ-LIP is sandwiched between ǫ-LDP and 2ǫ-LDP.
(2) We apply the LIP notion to privacy-preserving data
aggregation. Focusing on four applications including: survey,
(weighted) summation and histogram, we present a utility-
privacy optimization framework with the goal of minimizing
the mean squared error while satisfying the LIP constraints.
We deploy the randomized response type of perturbation
mechanisms. We formulate two perturbation and aggregation
models, including: binary-input binary-output (BIBO) model,
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) model, and derive the
corresponding optimal perturbation parameters in closed form
and discuss how each application can be realized. We show
that one set of the optimal solution can minimize the MSE and
the Mean absolute error (MAE) between the raw data and the
perturbed data simultaneously. We theoretically demonstrate
the advantages of the proposed mechanism and compare
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with the LDP mechanisms. For comparison, we also study
a centralized version of data aggregation under information
privacy (CIP), and derive its optimal utility-privacy tradeoff.
(3) We validate our analysis using simulations on both
synthetic and real-world datasets (i.e., Karosak, a website-
click stream data set, and Gowalla, a location aggregation data
set). Both theoretical and simulation results show that optimal
perturbation mechanisms under ǫ-LIP always achieve a better
utility-privacy tradeoff than those under ǫ-LDP when ǫ > 0,
especially when the prior is not uniformly distributed. In the
MIMO case, We show that when the domain size increases, the
advantage of the LIP is enhanced. We show that the advantages
of the context-aware LIP are two-fold: on one hand, users
are setting the perturbation parameters according to the prior
knowledge; on the other hand, the adversary is allowed to
build prior-related estimators that can minimize the expected
errors. When compared with CIP, it always leads to a better
utility-privacy tradeoff than LIP, as the server possesses global
information. However, the utility gap is not large.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the proposed LIP notion and its
relationship with other existing privacy notions. In Section III,
we introduce the system model and problem formulation. In
Section IV, we derive the utility-privacy tradeoff under the
several applications. In Section V, we present the simulation
results and compare utility-privacy tradeoffs among different
models. In Section VI, we offer concluding remarks and
discuss future directions.
II. PRIVACY DEFINITIONS
In local privacy-preserving data release, each user uploads
its perturbed data directly to an untrusted aggregator. In this
section, we first recap two existing privacy notions in localized
settings, and then present our new LIP definition.
The traditional LDP definition guarantees that each user’s
perturbed data has a similar probability to result in the same
output for any two inputs from the data domain D:
Definition 1. (ǫ-Localized Differential Privacy (LDP)) [27] A
mechanism M which takes input X and outputs Y satisfies
ǫ-LDP for some ǫ ∈ R+, if ∀x, x′ ∈ D and ∀y ∈ Range(M):
Pr(M(x) = y)
Pr(M(x′) = y) ≤ e
ǫ, (1)
LDP provides strong context-free privacy guarantee against
worst-case adversaries. However, there are many scenarios
where some context of X is available (e.g., prior distribution).
In such situations, introducing context provides relaxed privacy
guarantees. One such definition is mutual information privacy,
which uses the mutual information between Y , X to measure
the average information leakage of X contained in Y :
Definition 2. (ǫ-Mutual Information Privacy (MIP)) [22] A
mechanism M which takes input X and outputs Y , satisfies
ǫ-MIP for some ǫ ∈ R+, if the mutual information between X
and Y satisfies I(X ;Y ) ≤ ǫ, where I(X ;Y ) is:∑
x,y∈D
Pr(X = x, Y = y) log
Pr(X = x, Y = y)
Pr(X = x)Pr(Y = y)
. (2)
Originally, MIP was proposed under the centralized setting
where X is the database or individual items and Y is a query
output. Here we can adapt it to the local setting, where X and
Y are each individual user’s input and output.
Although MIP is context-aware, it is a relative weak privacy
notion since it only bounds the average information leakage.
There may exist some (x, y) pair that makes the ratio between
the joint and product of marginal distributions very large
(while the joint probability is very small).
In order to limit the information leakage of every pair of
realizations of X and Y , we consider a bound on the ratio
between the prior Pr(X) and posterior Pr(X |Y ), which leads
to our proposed localized information privacy notion:
Definition 3. (ǫ-Localized Information Privacy (LIP)) A mech-
anism M which takes input X and output Y satisfies ǫ-LIP
for some ǫ ∈ R+, if ∀x, y ∈ D:
e−ǫ ≤ Pr(X = x)
Pr(X = x|Y = y) ≤ e
ǫ. (3)
Intuitively, LIP guarantees that having the knowledge of
users’ priors, the adversary can’t infer too much additional
information about each input x by observing each output y.
Note that, when ǫ is small, this ratio is bounded close to
1. Definition (3) can be viewed as the localized version of
information privacy, which focused on a centralized setting
[28], and the main differences are in the definitions of input
and output. Again, here X and Y stand for each user’s input
and output variables, respectively.
In the following, We show that LIP is a stronger privacy
notion than MIP, since the latter only provides an average
privacy guarantee while LIP bounds the leakage on every pair
of realizations of X and Y .
Proposition 1. If a mechanism M satisfies ǫ-LIP, it also
satisfies ǫ-MIP.
Proof. Assume that M satisfies ǫ-LIP. By Bayes rules, we
have that, ∀x, y ∈ D:
e−ǫ ≤ Pr(X = x, Y = y)
Pr(X = x)Pr(Y = y)
≤ eǫ. (4)
Substituting (4) into (2), we get:
I(X,Y ) ≤ ǫ
∑
x,y∈D
Pr(x, y) = ǫ,
where
∑
x,y∈D Pr(x, y) = 1.
Furthermore, the following theorem shows the relationship
between LIP and LDP:
Theorem 1. If a mechanism M satisfies ǫ-LIP, then it also
satisfies 2ǫ-LDP; if a mechanism M satisfies ǫ-LDP, then it
also satisfies ǫ-LIP.
Proof. To prove the first part, consider a mechanism M that
takes any two inputs X = x, X = x′ and outputs the same
Y = y.
When M satisfies ǫ-LIP, using the Bayes rule, Definition
(3) is equivalent to:
e−ǫ ≤ Pr(Y = y)
Pr(Y = y|X = x) ≤ e
ǫ. (5)
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TABLE I
LIST OF SYMBOLS
D The universe of input values
X Input random variable
P User’s prior distribution
Y Output random variable
X¯ Set of input data
Y¯ Set of output data
i Index User (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...,N})
N Total number of users
M Privacy preserving mechanism
q Set of perturbation parameters
f(·) Aggregation function
Xˆ Aggregated data of user
Sˆ Minimized mean square error estimation
ǫ Privacy budget
U Utility measurement
E Mean square error function
T Feasible region of q
Since the above also holds for X = x′, we have:
e−ǫ ≤ Pr(Y = y)
Pr(Y = y|X = x′) ≤ e
ǫ. (6)
Inequality (5) is equivalent to:
e−ǫ ≤ Pr(Y = y|X = x)
Pr(Y = y)
≤ eǫ.
Since both of the metrics in above inequalities are positive,
by multiplying these two inequalities, we get:
e−2ǫ ≤ Pr(Y = y|X = x)
Pr(Y = y|X = x′) ≤ e
2ǫ.
Since we can switch x and x′, it is equivalent to the definition
of 2ǫ-LDP.
To prove the second part, if M satisfies ǫ-LDP, we have:
Pr(Y = y|X = x′) ≤ eǫPr(Y = y|X = x).
On the other hand:
Pr(Y = y) =
∑
x′∈D
Pr(Y = y|X = x′)Pr(X = x′)
≤eǫPr(Y = y|X = x)
∑
x′∈D
Pr(X = x′)
=eǫPr(Y = y|X = x),
by switching inputs, we can also get:
Pr(Y = y) ≥ e−ǫPr(Y = y|X = x),
which means that M also satisfies ǫ-LIP.
Thus, ǫ-LIP is a more relaxed privacy notion than ǫ-LDP.
However, it is stronger than 2ǫ-LDP. Intuitively, LIP relaxes
LDP because LDP results in the same output y for every
input x, no matter what his/her prior is. On the other hand,
for inputs with different priors, LIP perturbs differently. For
example, when a user with Pr(X = 1) = 0.99, if he holds
X = 1, which means his real data is consistent with the prior
knowledge. As LIP bounds on the ratio between prior and
posterior, it has a large probability to output 1 to make the
posterior probability similar to its prior; if he holds X = 0,
which has a small prior to happen, he also has large probability
to output 1 to make the posterior probability small.
X X X NX
Y Y Y NY
ƵƌĂƚŽƌ
͘͘͘
͘͘͘
hƐĞƌƐ
WĞƌƚƵƌďĂƚŝŽŶ
ŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ

hƐĞƌϭ hƐĞƌϮ hƐĞƌϯ hƐĞƌE
Ö  S f Xo
  N
Fig. 3. System Model of Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation.
III. MODELS AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System and Threat Models
Consider a data aggregation system with N users and a
data curator. Each user i locally generates private data which
is denoted as random variable Xi, taking value xi from the
domain D = {a1, a2...ad} with probability P ik = Pr(Xi = k).
We assume that Xis are independent from each other. Before
publishing his/her data to the curator, each user locally per-
turbs it by a privacy-preserving mechanismMi. The output is
denoted as Yi which takes value yi from D. The mechanism
Mi maps each possible input to each possible output with
certain probability, the set of them are called perturbation pa-
rameters (denoted as qi). After receiving each user’s perturbed
data, the curator computes a statistical function on those data
(for example, estimating the frequency of certain input which
will be useful for data mining). The system model is depicted
in Fig. 3.
The curator is considered as untrusted due to both internal
and external threats. On the one hand, users’ private data is
profitable and companies can be interested in user tracking or
selling their data. On the other hand, data breaches may happen
from time to time due to hacking activities. Denote the true
aggregated result by f(X¯), where X¯ = {X1, X2, ..., XN}.
The curator (adversary) observes all the users’ perturbed
outputs Y¯ = {Y1, Y2, ..., YN} and tries to obtain an estimate
of S = f(X¯). Furthermore, we assume that the adversary
possesses knowledge of prior distributions of users’ inputs,
and the algorithms/perturbation mechanisms that users adopt
to publish their data. The curator aims at performing accu-
rate estimations using all the information above, but is also
interested in inferring each user’s real input Xi.
For different applications of data aggregation, the definition
of f(·)s varies. In this paper, four most common applications
are considered:
• Survey: the curator is interested in estimating how many
people in the survey possess a private value v. Each
user’s data can be mapped into a binary bit as: fi(Xi) =
1{v=Xi}, where 1{a=b} is an indicator function, which
is 1 if a = b; 0 if a 6= b. Then the curator just
sum up all the collected data to get the answer. Thus
S = f(X¯) =
∑N
i=1 1{v=Xi}.
• Summation: Summation results are usually used to mea-
sure an average property of the surveyed individuals.
For example, the census bureau wants to survey the
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average income over a group of people, mathematically,
S = f(X¯) = 1N
∑N
i=1Xi.
• Weighted summation (linear combination): It’s straight-
forward to extend the direct summation to a weighted
summation (plus an offset) for more general applications.
For example, assume that the curator is interested in
some particular users more than others, such as employer
v.s. employees; adults v.s. children; the professionals v.s.
amateurs. Thus, these important users’ data are assigned
a larger coefficient than others. The offset can be used
as a correction to the raw data. For example, avoiding
summation blowing up or controlling data in a particular
range. Thus S = f(X¯) =
∑N
i=1 (aiXi + bi).
• Histogram: In this application, the curator is interested
in estimating how many people possess each of the data
category in D, or classify people according to their data
value. For example, the curator wants to statistically esti-
mate a location frequency matrix with each entry standing
for how many people are within a particular location.
For this application, S is a set of ”categorized” data:
{S1, S2, ..., Sd}, such that, ∀k ∈ D, Sk =
∑N
i=1 1{Xi=k}.
B. Privacy and Utility Definitions
The privacy of each user’s input satisfies LIP and is pa-
rameterized by the privacy budget (ǫ) in Definition (3). The
smaller ǫ is, the higher privacy level the mechanism satisfies.
Note that, for simplicity, we consider ǫ to be the same for all
the users; however it is straightforward to extend our model
and results to different ǫ for different users. Under LIP, the
privacy constraints can be formulated as: ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}
and ∀xi, yi ∈ D, there is
e
−ǫ ≤
Pr(Yi = yi|Xi = xi)
Pr(Yi = yi)
≤ eǫ. (7)
Note that, qi , {Pr(Yi = yi|Xi = xi), ∀xi, yi ∈ D}.
When ǫ is given, the set of inequalities in Eq. (7) constrains
qi to be within a feasible region Ti, ∀i ∈ 1, 2, ..N .
The definition of utility depends on the application scenario.
For example, in statistical aggregation, estimation accuracy is
often measured by absolute error or mean square error [29]
[30]; in location tracking, it is typically measured by Euclidean
distance [24]; in privacy-preserving data publishing, distortion
is usually used to measure the utility [22].
Focus on the four applications discussed above, we define
utility as the inverse of the Mean Square Error (MSE):
U(S, Sˆ) = −E(S, Sˆ), where E(S, Sˆ) = E[(S − Sˆ)2], Sˆ is
the estimated S. Notice that, given P i, E(S, Sˆ) depends only
on each user’s perturbation parameters: q1, ...,qN , as any
estimator Sˆ will depend on the output Y¯ whose distribution
is a function of qi. Thus, maximizing the utility is equivalent
to find the optimal parameters to minimize the MSE.
C. Problem Formulation
In general, there is a tradeoff between utility and privacy.
We can formulate the following optimization problem to find
the optimal perturbation mechanism that yields the optimal
tradeoff:
min E(q1, ...,qN ),
s.t. qi ∈ Ti, ∀i ∈ 1, 2, ..N.
(8)
From [31], it is well known that the optimal estimator that
results in the minimized mean square error (MMSE) is Sˆ =
g(Y¯ ) = E[S|Y¯ ]. Since E[E[S|Y¯ ]] = E[S], Sˆ is an unbiased
estimator. Therefore, we use the MMSE estimator in Eq. (8).
Problem Decomposition: Next, we show how the problem
defined in Eq. (8) can be decomposed into the local cases.
Since we assume that each user’s input is independent from
each other, all the f(·) functions above can be decomposed
into local functions of each Xi: local functions in application
1 and application 4 are indicator functions (or vector); local
functions in application 3 is a linear function. Without loss of
generality, we denote the local function for user i as fi.
In the local setting, users independently perturb their data,
thus each of them results in a MSE in aggregation, which is
denoted by Ei = E[(fi(Xi)− E[fi(Xi)|Yi])2] (for the fourth
application, denote Eki = E[(fki (Xi)−E[fki (Xi)|Yi])2]) as the
MSE of user i when aggregating the k-th data, and the overall
utility defined in Eq. (8) satisfies decomposition proposition:
Proposition 2. The global optimization problem defined in Eq.
(8) can be decomposed into N local optimization problems,
under independent user inputs.
min
(qi)∈Ti
E(q1, ...,qN ) =
N∑
i=1
min
(qi)∈Ti
Ei(qi). (9)
Proof. Observe that, the f(·)s in the four basic applications
above can be expressed as a summation over all the fi(Xi)s,
as the semantic of aggregation implies a summation opera-
tion. thus the summation based MMSE estimator Sˆ can be
expressed as:
E[S|Y¯ ] = E[f(X¯)|Y¯ ] = E[{f(X1, X2, ..., XN )}|Y¯ ]
(a)
=E[f1(X1)|Y¯ ] + E[f2(X2)|Y¯ ], ...,+E[fN (XN )|Y¯ ]}
(b)
=
N∑
i=1
{E[fi(Xi)|Yi]}.
(10)
where (a) in Eq. (10) is due to the independence of Xis,
and (b) is because Xi is only correlated with Yi in the output
sequence. Thus E(S, Sˆ) can be derived as:
E(S, Sˆ) = E[(
N∑
i=1
{fi(Xi)− E[fi(Xi)|Yi]})2]. (11)
Note that, for the application of histogram, the error forms
a error vector that (Sk, Sˆk)
d
k=1. By the definition of second
order norm. the mean square error of this case is:
E(Sk, Sˆk)dk=1 =
d∑
k=1
E[(
N∑
i=1
{fki (Xi)− E[fki (Xi)|Yi]})2],
(12)
where fki (Xi) = 1{Xi=k}.
For the first three applications, we next show that the total
MSE can be decompose into the summation of local MSEs.
(the proof for histogram is shown in Appendix.D.
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(a) The binary model: different local priors
and asymmetric perturbation
(b) Model with multiple input and multiple
output
(c) Centralized binary information privacy
model (trusted server based)
Fig. 4. Different models for the perturbation mechanism considered in this paper ((a) and (b) are for the i-th user).
E(S, Sˆ) = E[(
N∑
i=1
{fki (Xi)− E[f
k
i (Xi)|Yi]})
2]
= (
N∑
i=1
E{fki (Xi)− E[f
k
i (Xi)|Yi]})
2
− 2
N∑
j=1,l 6=j
E{(fkj (Xi)− E[f
k
j (Xi)|Yj ])(f
k
l (Xi)−E[f
k
l (Xi)|Yl])}.
The cross terms equal to 0 because ∀j, l ∈ {1, N} and j 6= l:
E{(fkj (Xi)−E[f
k
j (Xi)|Yj ])(f
k
l (Xi)− E[f
k
l (Xi)|Yl])}]
=E[(fkj (Xi)−E[f
k
j (Xi)|Yj ])]E[(f
k
l (Xi)−E[f
k
l (Xi)|Yl])]
=[E(fkj (Xi))− E{E[f
k
j (Xi)|Yj ]}][E(f
k
l (Xi))− E{E[f
k
l (Xi)|Yl]}].
(13)
In (13), E(fkj (Xi))−E{E[fkj (Xi)|Yj ]} and E(fkl (Xi))−
E{E[fkl (Xi)|Yl]} are 0, thus, E(S, Sˆ) =
∑N
i=1 Eki (qi)
We next show that the overall optimal solutions (perturba-
tion parameters) satisfy each local privacy constraints:
Assume that for each user, the minimized Ei(qi) = ei is
achieved at qi∗ ∈ Ti, then E(q1∗, ...,qN∗) =
∑N
i=1 ei.
If for some userk who takes parameters q
k ∈ Tk, by
assumption, we know that Ek(qk) ≥ ek. Thus
k∑
i=1
Ei(qi∗) + Ek(qk) +
N∑
i=k+1
Ei(qi∗) ≥
N∑
i=1
ei.
That means the minimal value of E(q1, ...,qN ), where qi ∈
Ti, ∀i ∈ [1, N ] can be achieved if for each user, qi = qi∗.
By proposition 2, when the perturbation parameters of each
user are optimal, the overall MSE of the mechanism achieves
its minimum. In addition, each user can perform its local
optimization independent from each other, which well suits
the local setting.
Notice that the resulted MSE by a MMSE estimator for
each user is Ei(qi) = E[V ar(fi(Xi)|Yi)]. By the law of total
variance:
E[V ar(fi(Xi)|Yi)]
=V ar[fi(Xi)]− V ar[E(fi(Xi)|Yi)]
=V ar[fi(Xi)]− V ar[fi(Xˆi)].
(14)
In the context-aware setting, V ar[fi(Xi)] is a constant, thus
the MSE is a function of the variance of each user’s estimator.
IV. PRIVACY-UTILITY TRADE-OFF
In this section, we study the privacy-utility tradeoffs by
solving the optimization problems defined in Eq. (8). We start
by a binary input binary output (BIBO) model where each
user has an input/output range of {0, 1}, which well suits the
application of survey. In the BIBO model, we illustrate the
way of perturbation by analysis on the optimal solutions. we
first assume that fi(Xi) = Xi due to settings of the first three
applications, we discuss optimal solutions for each of the four
applications in section IV-C.
A. Utility-Privacy Tradeoff under the Binary Input Binary
Output Model
The binary model is widely used for survey: each individ-
ual’s data is first mapped to one bit, than randomly perturbed
before publishing to the curator.
For a binary input/output model, each user has a binary
input range, i.e, D = {0, 1} (shown in Fig. 4(a)). As a direct
result, the V ar(Xi) in (14) becomes P
i
1(1− P i1). Denote the
perturbation parameters by:
Pr(Yi = 1|Xi = 0) = qi0,
P r(Yi = 0|Xi = 1) = qi1.
(15)
Next we derive the concrete optimization objective and
constraints. By Eq. (10), the MMSE estimator Xˆi for user
i is derived as:
Xˆi = E[Xi|Yi] =P i1[
qi1
λi0
(1− Yi) + 1− q
i
1
λi1
Yi], (16)
where λi0 = Pr(Yi = 0) = (1 − P1)(1 − qi0) + P1qi1 and
λi1 = Pr(Yi = 1) = (1 − P1)qi0 + P1(1 − qi1). On the other
hand,
V ar(Xˆi) =V ar{P i1 [
qi1
λi0
(1− Yi) + 1− q
i
1
λi1
Yi]}
=P i1
(λi0 − qi1)2
λi0λ
i
1
.
(17)
Take (17) into (14), the each user’s MSE function Ei(qi0, qi1)
can be derived as
Ei(qi0, qi1) = P i1(1− P i1)−
[P i1(λ
i
0 − qi1)]2
λi0λ
i
1
. (18)
For the privacy constraints, by Eq. (7), when the perturbation
mechanism satisfies ǫ-LIP: we have:
e−ǫ ≤ {F i1, F i2 , F i3, F i4} ≤ eǫ, ∀i = 1, 2...N. (19)
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where F i1 , F
i
2, F
i
3, F
i
4 are directly derived from Definition (3):
F i1(q
i
0, q
i
1) =
λi
0
qi
1
, F i2(q
i
0, q
i
1) =
λi
1
1−qi
1
, F i3(q
i
0, q
i
1) =
λi
0
1−qi
0
,
F i4(q
i
0, q
i
1) =
λi
1
qi
0
. Then, the feasible region Ti is defined as
those (qi0, q
i
1) pairs satisfying constraints in Eq. (19).
By proposition 2, the optimization problem of Opt-binary-
LIP can be reformulated as:
min Ei(qi0, qi1),
s.t. (19), ∀i = 1, 2...N. (20)
We have the following result:
Theorem 2. In Opt-binary-LIP, for the i-th user, the optimal
(qi0, q
i
1) pairs that minimize Ei(qi0, qi1) in problem (20) are:
either qi∗0 = P
i
1/e
ǫ and qi∗1 = (1−P i1)/eǫ, or qi∗0 = 1−P i1/eǫ
and qi∗1 = 1− (1−P i1)/eǫ, for any given ǫ ≥ 0. The resulting
MSE by (qi∗0 , q
i∗
1 ) is:
E∗bi−LIP =
N∑
i=1
{P i1(1− P i1)(2e−ǫ − e−2ǫ)}. (21)
Proof. Here we outline the proof sketch (detailed proofs are
shown in Appendix. A.
(1) We show that Ei is monotonically increasing with qi0 and
qi1 within the region of {qi0 ≥ 0}∩ {qi1 ≥ 0}∩ {qi0 + qi1 ≤ 1};
(2) We simplify the feasible region Ti by showing that both
Ei(qi0, qi1) and Ti are symmetric w.r.t. point (0.5, 0.5); Then
we change Ti to the monotonic region in step. (1).
(3) By the monotonicity, showing that the optimal solution
is at the boundary of Ti, which is a linear function of (qi0, qi1).
(4) The final step is to show that optimal solution is at the
intersection of two linear functions in step (3) by testing the
monotonicity of Ei(qi0, qi1) on the boundary.
Note that, the optimal solution of each user is achieved when
F i1(q
i
0, q
i
1) = F
i
4(q
i
0, q
i
1) = e
ǫ (or F i2(q
i
0, q
i
1) = F
i
3(q
i
0, q
i
1) =
eǫ). Intuitively, to increase utility, we need the probability of
perturbation as small as possible (when qi0 + q
i
1 ≤ 0.5), and
the smallest perturbation probability is bounded by the privacy
constraints. As a result, the optimal solution is at the point
where the privacy requirement is just met. The two optimal
(qi∗0 , q
i∗
1 ) pairs are symmetric w.r.t. (0.5, 0.5). This is due to
the symmetric properties of the binary input/output model. The
symmetric properties can also be explained as: if we do not
consider privacy, utility is maximized in two ways: the first
way is each user publishes his/her data directly; the second
way is swapping his/her data from 0 to 1 and 1 to 0 before
publishing it.
From qi∗0 = P
i
1/e
ǫ and qi∗1 = (1− P i1)/eǫ, we can see that
qi∗0 is proportional to P
i
1 , and q
i∗
1 is proportional to 1 − P i1.
Intuitively, from the perspective of one user, when his/her true
input value xi’s prior is small, directly revealing xi will leak
too much information about it. In such cases, to satisfy LIP
constraints, a large perturbation probability is needed to limit
the posterior about xi. On the contrary, if xi happens with
a large prior, directly releasing xi will reveal little additional
information. Thus a small perturbation probability can be used
for xi in this case.
Minimizing mean absolute error between the raw data
and the perturbed data: In many applications, the published
data by each user should contain certain information even for
the parties with no prior knowledge. For example, the reported
locations from smart phones: facilities or companies want to
take advantages from the aggregated location data frequencies
on one hand, the users are uploading locations for location
based service on the other. As a result, although the locally
published data are perturbed, it should remain a certain level of
accuracy. As a result, We want Yi as close to Xi as possible as
long as it still satisfies the privacy constraints. As P i is given,
we want the mean absolute error (MAE) between Xi and Yi
as small as possible, that is, we also want to minimize:
E[|Xi − Yi|], ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. (22)
Regarding at the optimal solutions of the binary model, we
have the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The optimal solution that minimize the MSE
defined in (18) and the MAE defined in (22) simultaneously
is: qi∗0 = P
i
1/e
ǫ and qi∗1 = (1− P i1)/eǫ.
Proof. Notice that there are two set of optimal solutions under
the Opt-binary-LIP model.
The MAE defined in (22) is
1∑
xi=0
1∑
yi=0
|xi − yi|Pr(Xi = xi)Pr(Yi = yi|Xi = xi)
=P i1q
i
1 + (1− P i1)qi0.
(23)
As P i1 is given, minimizing (23) is equivalent to minimize q
i
1
and qi0, which are also restricted by the privacy constraint, thus
the optimal solution qi∗0 = P
i
1/e
ǫ and qi∗1 = (1 − P i1)/eǫ can
also minimize the MAE.
From the result of proposition. 3, we can see a trend from
the optimal perturbation parameters that minimize the MAE
and MSE at the same time, that is when ǫ increase, the raw
data is more likely to be directly published. Notice that, with
the optimal solutions,
λi0 =P
i
1
(1− P i1)
eǫ
+ (1− P i1)(1 −
P i1
eǫ
) = (1− P i1),
λi1 =P
i
1(1−
(1 − P i1)
eǫ
) + (1− P i1)
P i1
eǫ
= P i1 .
Thus the distribution of each Xi is identical to Yi, this also
guarantees that the output Yi is very close to Xi.
Comparison with Optimized LDP: We next compare our
optimal LIP-based perturbation mechanism with the optimal
LDP-based one. Define the Opt-binary-LDP problem to be
the same with Opt-binary-LIP in (20), except having different
privacy constraints of LDP: {Ri1, Ri2, Ri3, Ri4} ≤ eǫ, where
Ri1, R
i
2, R
i
3, R
i
4 are derived from Definition (1): R
i
1 =
1−qi
1
qi
0
,
Ri2 =
qi
0
1−qi
1
, Ri3 =
qi
1
1−qi
0
and Ri4 =
1−qi
0
qi
1
.
Proposition 4. In Opt-binary-LDP, for the i-th user, the
optimal solution for (qi0, q
i
1) is q
i∗
0 = q
i∗
1 =
1
eǫ+1 , which results
in a MSE E∗bi−LDP of:
N∑
i=1
{P i1(1−P i1)−
[P i1(1 − P i1)(1 − eǫ)]2
(1− P i1 + P i1eǫ)(eǫ − P i1eǫ + P i1)
}. (24)
Given any fixed ǫ ≥ 0, we have E∗bi−LDP ≥ E∗bi−LIP .
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Proof. The proof of the optimal solution is similar to that of
Opt-binary-LIP, the only difference is the feasible region in
Opt-binary-LIP is flexible for different priors, while the fea-
sible region in Opt-binary-LDP is fixed. The optimal solution
also coincides with the one used in [15].
For the second part, it’s easy to check by taking derivative
over eǫ that E∗bi−LIP ≤ E∗bi−LDP , where E∗bi−LIP = E∗bi−LDP
if ǫ = 0 or ǫ =∞. This means LIP provides increased utility
given any ǫ. We then taking derivative of P i1 over ∆E∗ =
E∗bi−LDP − E∗bi−LIP , result shows that ∂∆E
∗
∂P i
1
= 0 when P i1 =
0.5. As ∆E∗
(P i
1
=0.5)
≥ 0, E∗bi−LDP ≥ E∗bi−LIP for any P i1.
Result also shows that as |P i1−0.5| grows,∆E∗ also increases.
The above result shows that, Opt-binary-LIP always
achieves a better utility than Opt-binary-LDP under any ǫ, this
is because explicitly considering prior in the privacy definition
allows a larger search space for optimal parameters than that
in Opt-binary-LDP. We can also learn this result from the
aspect of information theory, when |P i1 − 0.5| is small, then
the H(Xi) is large, which means Xi has the largest amount
of uncertainty, thus knowing the prior of Xi does not help in
perturbation; However, when H(Xi) is small, prior knowledge
of Xi provides a clearer indication of the real value, thus the
context-aware model achieves enhanced advantages.
The binary case is an illustrative example that shows how
we derive the optimal solutions, as the problem is equivalent
to finding the maximum in a monotonically increasing region,
thus the methods with goal to find the station points in
the feasible region such as Lagrangian multiplier and KKT
conditions are not applicable. On the other hand, thanks to the
theorem that the maximum value of the monotocity function
can be found at the boundary, the problem can be first regarded
as developing the monotocity region and then finding the
boundary values of the parameters. Moreover, with the goal
to minimize the MAE, we can further restrict the optimal
solutions to make the model more practical.
When each user has a same prior and when the perturbation
channel is symmetric, these can be considered as special cases
of the BIBO model, and details are referred to our conference
version in [1].
B. Utility-Privacy Tradeoff under MIMO Model
More generally, we study the case in which D has a large
domain, i.e., D = {a1, a2, ..., ad} with prior distribution
Pr(Xi = am) = P
i
m. This case well suits the application
of summation and weighted summation and we denote this
model as MIMO model. The optimization of the MIMO model
is obviously obscure, as there are d2 parameters that need to
optimize for a single user. (shown in 4(b))
Assume that a random-response perturbation mechanism
which satisfies ǫ-LIP takes input Xi and output Yi (Yi has the
same range, we discuss the optimal output range after deriving
the main results) with probability Pr(Yi = ak|Xi = am) =
qimk. Denote Pr(Yi = ak) = λ
i
k . Thus, by (7):
e−ǫ ≤ Pr(Xi = am)
Pr(Xi = am|Yi = ak) ≤ e
ǫ, ∀m, k ∈ 1, 2, ..., d (25)
By Bayes rules, (25) can be transferred to:
e−ǫ ≤ λ
i
k
qimk
≤ eǫ, ∀m, k ∈ 1, 2, ..., d (26)
In (14), V ar[Xi] =
∑d
m=1 a
2
mP
i
m − (
∑d
m=1 amP
i
m)
2, and
Xˆi =E[Xi|Yi] =
d∑
m=1
ajPr(Xi = am|Yi)
=
d∑
m=1
d∑
k=1
amPr(Xi = am|Yi = ak)1ik,
(27)
where 1ik is the indicator function of 1
i
{Yi=ak}
, which is 1 if
Yi = ak and 0 if not, thus 1
i
k can be regarded as a binary
random variable which has the distribution of: Pr(1ik = 1) =
λik and Pr(1
i
k = 0) = 1−λik, as a result: V ar[1ik] = λik(1−
λik) and Cov[1
i
k,1
i
l ] = −λikλil .
V ar[Xˆi] =
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
d∑
k=1
amanq
i
mkq
i
nkV ar[1
i
k]
+
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
d∑
k=1
d∑
l=1;l 6=k
amanq
i
mkq
i
nlCov[1
i
k,1
i
l ]
=
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
d∑
k=1
amanP
i
mP
i
nq
i
mk(
qink(1− λ
i
k)
λik
−
d∑
l=1;l 6=k
q
i
nl)
=
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
d∑
k=1
amanP
i
mP
i
nq
i
mk(
qink
λik
− 1).
(28)
Denote qi as the set of {qi11, qi12, ..., qi1d, ..., qidd}, By propo-
sition. 2. The optimization problem of the MIMO model, Opt-
mino-LIP is formulated as:
min Ei(qi), (22)
s.t. (25), ∀i = 1, 2...N. (29)
Theorem 3. For the constraint optimization problem defined
in (29). The optimal solutions is: qi∗mm = 1 − (1 − P im)/eǫ,
qi∗mk = P
i
k/e
ǫ, for all m, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, m 6= k.
Brief steps of proof (detailed proof is shown in Appendix.
B.
• Regardless of the privacy constraints, we first show that
the maximum value of V ar[Xˆi] can be reached when
the qimm = 1, for m ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}. also, the minimum
value of V ar[Xˆi] can be reached when q
i
mk = λk , for
any m, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}.
• We then take derivative over a randomly chosen param-
eter: qimk and derive the monotonicity region.
• In each monotonicity region we show that the parameters
that decrease will first reach the boundary. Thus the
optimal solutions lies at the lower boundaries. As we
can permute the sequence of Yi, we can find d! optimal
solutions.
• Considering minimizing the MAE defined in (22), there
is only one set of optimal solution remaining.
From Theorem 3, we can see that the optimal solutions of
the Opt-mimo-LIP also lies at the boundary of the privacy
constraints. As ǫ increases, ∀m ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, all the qimms
are increasing while all the qimks are decreasing (m 6= k),
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and the value of qimks are proportional to P
i
ks. thus an input
value that has a larger prior should also be output with a large
probability.
For example, consider a model in which D = {1, 2, 3} the
prior of one of the users is given as: P1 = 0.1, P2 = 0.2,
P3 = 0.7. By Theorem 3 q
∗
11 = 1 − 0.9/ǫ, q∗22 = 1 − 0.8/ǫ,
q∗33 = 1 − 0.3/ǫ, q∗21 = q∗31 = 0.1/ǫ, q∗12 = q∗32 = 0.2/ǫ,
q∗13 = q
∗
23 = 0.7/ǫ. When ǫ increases, each value is more
likely to be directly published. As 3 has a larger prior than
1 and 2, if 1 and 2 are not directly published, they are more
likely to be published as a 3.
Notice the main goal of (29) is to minimize the MSE
rather than the MAE, so, we still deploy the MMSE estimator.
Regardless of the goal to minimize MAE, there are d! optimal
solutions for a single user in the problem of Opt-mimo-
LIP, as we can randomly permute the order of Yi. When
minimizing the MAE, there is a unique solution remaining,
as : λik = P
i
k(1− (1− P ik))/eǫ +
∑d
j 6=k P
i
jP
i
k/e
ǫ = P ik.
Similarly, we formulate the optimization problem for the
LDP, which is the same goal defined in (29) while subject to
the constraints of LDP: ∀m,n, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, m 6= n, there
is
qimk
qi
nk
≤ eǫ. We derive the optimal solutions for Opt-mimo-
LDP as qi∗mm =
eǫ
eǫ+d−1 , q
i∗
mk =
1
eǫ+d−1 , ∀m, k ∈ 1, 2, ..., d,
m 6= k. Direct comparison between the two mechanisms
involves large amount of calculation, thus we compare them
in simulation .
Optimal Output Range: In terms of the optimal range for
each Yi, previous models are considering Yi has the same
domain with Xi, now we consider that the outputs take values
from a different domain size. Denote the domain of the input
as Dx = {a1, a2, ..., ad}; the domain of the output as Dy =
{a1, a2, ..., af}. When d is fixed, we want to find the optimal
value of f .
Theorem 4. In the Opt-mimo-LIP problem, when the input
range of d is fixed, the optimal output range f∗ is f∗ = d.
Detailed proof is shown in Appendix. C.
From Theorem 4, we know the optimal output range is the
same with the input. This property is helpful for model setting.
C. Applications to Histogram Estimation
Obviously, for the application of survey, the Opt-binary-LIP
is suitable, and Opt-mimo-LIP can deal with the problem of
direct summation and weighted summation. We now consider
the problem of estimating a histogram.
The difference between the application of the histogram
and other applications is even though for each user, before
uploading data, the perturbation mechanism still takes one
input data and outputs one data, the estimator of a histogram
is a random vector rather than a random variable, as the value
of each data stands for a category.
Derive the optimal estimator of the histogram vector,
Sˆ = {Sˆ1, Sˆ2, ..., Sˆd} = {E[S1|Y¯ ], E[S2|Y¯ ], ..., E[Sd|Y¯ ]},
with each entry:
E[Sk|Y¯ ] = E[
N∑
i=1
1{Xi=ak}|Y¯ ] =
N∑
i=1
E[1{Xi=ak}|Yi].
(30)
Thus the mean square error of the estimation is
E[
d∑
k=1
(Sk − Sˆk)
2]
=
d∑
k=1
E[(
N∑
i=1
{1{Xi=ak} − E[1{Xi=ak}|Yi]})
2]
a
=
d∑
k=1
{
N∑
i=1
E[({1{Xi=ak} −E[1{Xi=ak}|Yi]})
2]
=
N∑
i=1
d∑
k=1
{V ar(1{Xi=ak})− V ar(E[1{Xi=ak}|Yi])}.
(31)
The (a) of (31) is because each user’s local error is indepen-
dent, and the expectation of the unbiased estimator is identical
to that of the estimated value.
Thus the problem of estimating a histogram can be formu-
lated as:
min (31), (22)
s.t. (27), ∀i = 1, 2...N. (32)
Theorem 5. The optimal perturbation parameters of problem
defined in (32) is qi∗mm = 1− (1−P im)/eǫ, qi∗mk = P ik/eǫ, for
all m, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, m 6= k.
Proof. Detailed proof is shown in Appendix. D.
The application of histogram can be viewed as a special
case of the Opt-mimo-LIP because in the Opt-mimo-LIP, the
optimal solutions are to make the estimation of each user ’s
data as close to the real value as possible, while the request
of the histogram is to classify each user’s data as accurate as
possible, when the perturbation parameters are making each
of the estimation as accurate as possible, it also handle the
problem of identifying its category.
For implementation of the histogram, users are still publish-
ing data according to the Opt-mimo-LIP perturbation mech-
anism. After receiving the published data by each user, the
curator then estimates {E[S1|Yi], E[S2|Yi], ..., E[Sd|Yi]} =
{Pr(Xi = a1|Yi), P r(Xi = a2|Yi), ..., P r(Xi = ad|Yi)}
according to the optimal perturbation parameters.
D. Centralized Information Privacy (Binary case)
For comparison purposes, we now derive the formula for
centralized information privacy under the binary perturbation
mechanism, we first illustrate the idea by the global prior
model: Consider N users are in a data aggregating model who
directly submit their data to a trusted central aggregator, who
publishes a perturbed version Y of S = f(X) using a CIP
mechanism M(S). See Fig. 4(c). Assume that each user’s
input value is taken as a random variable Xi which takes
value from a range of Di = {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. It is
known that the prior distribution of Xi is: P
i
1 = Pr(X = 1),
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Denote D as the database holding all users’
data, where Di = Xi. Thus Pr(Di = 1) = P1. Assume
that the data the curator wants to aggregate is S =
∑N
i=1Di
and the trusted third party perturbs S by using a randomized
response mechanism M. Notice that D1,D2, ...,DN is a N
times Bernoulli trial, Thus:
Pr(S = s) = CsNP
s
1 (1− P1)N−s, (33)
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Definition 4. A mechanism M which takes input values of
D = {X1, X2, ..., XN} and output Y satisfies centralized
information privacy if ∀i, y{1, 2, ..., N} :
e−ǫ ≤ Pr(Di)
Pr(Di|Y = y) ≤ e
ǫ, (34)
Intuitively, the difference between the centralized and the
localized IP is the input of the mechanism: the input of the
centralized IP is a database, while the input of the LIP is
each user’s local data. In terms of the implementation, in the
settings of CIP, all the raw data is hold by the trusted server,
and the mechanism is run at the server rather than at each
user. The configuration of the centralized IP model is shown
in Fig.4(c).
Notice that the right side of the configuration of the central-
ized IP is multiple input multiple output LIP for a single user.
Based on this observation, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6. If the mechanism M which takes the inputs
of S and output Y satisfies ǫ-LIP, then it also satisfies the
centralized model defined in Definition (4).
Proof. If the mechanism M ǫ-LIP:
eǫPr(S = s) ≤ Pr(S = s|Y = y) ≤ eǫPr(S = s),
then, for any j ∈ 0, 1
Pr(Di = j|Y = y) =
N∑
s=1
Pr(Di = j|S = s)Pr(S = s|Y = y)
≤
N∑
s=1
Pr(Di = j|S = s)Pr(S = s)e
ǫ
=eǫPr(Di = j).
(35)
Do this again for the other side we can get:
Pr(Di = j|Y = y) ≥ e−ǫPr(Di = j). (36)
Thus, if the requirement of localized information privacy is
met, then centralized information privacy is also satisfied. It’s
easy to check it’s not vise versa as Di, Yi and S does not
form a Markov chain.
From Theorem 6, we know that localized information
privacy infers centralized information privacy. In terms of
the utility, we still want to minimize the mean square error:
E[(S − Sˆ)2] using the MMSE estimator: Sˆ = E[S|Y ]. Thus
the optimization problem with goal to minimize the MSE
while subject to the privacy constraints satisfying Definition
(5) involves large amount of calculation and is not the goal of
this paper, however, we can still find the optimal utility-privacy
trade off without specifying each parameter.
Proposition 5. When there is a global prior for each user, the
utility-privacy trade off of the centralized Information privacy
is found at the solutions of the optimization problem that
ECIP = E[(S − Sˆ)2],
s.t. e−ǫNP1 ≤ Sˆ ≤ N − e−ǫ(N − P1N).
(37)
Proof. We know by previous results:
E[(S − Sˆ)2] = V ar(S)− V ar(Sˆ), (38)
where V ar(S) = NP1(1 − P1). We now derive the V ar(Sˆ).
Base on the privacy constraints, we further derive the privacy
metric:
Pr(Di = 1)
Pr(Di = 1|Y ) =
P1∑N
s=1 Pr(Di = 1|S = s)Pr(S = s|Y )
=
NP1
E[S|Y ] ,
(39)
On the other hand:
Pr(Di = 0)
Pr(Di = 0|Y ) =
1− P1∑N
s=1 Pr(Di = 0|S = s)Pr(S = s|Y )
=
N −NP1
N − E[S|Y ] .
(40)
So, we have e−ǫ ≤ { NP1E[S|Y ] , NP1N−E[S|Y ]} ≤ eǫ, which further
infers e−ǫNP1 ≤ Sˆ ≤ N − e−ǫ(N − P1N).
To deriving the optimal solutions of each parameters is not
a main objective of this paper, however, we want to show the
comparison between the centralized IP and the localized IP.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we use simulation to validate our analyt-
ical results. In the first part, we validate our analysis using
synthetic data and via Monte-Carlo simulation. We first show
the advantages of the context-aware privacy notion (based
on LIP) versus the context-free notion (based on LDP), by
comparing their utility-privacy tradeoffs. Then we compare
different models of LIP and LDP under different privacy bud-
gets and prior distributions in both binary case and MIMO case
(with both global priors and local priors). At last, we validate
the analytical results through Monte-Carlo simulation, and
compare utility-privacy trade offs provided by the localized
models and the centralized model In section IV-D. In the
second part, we evaluate on two real-world datasets: Karosak
(click-streams of websites) and Gowalla (location check-in
data).
We evaluate utility by square root average MSE (
√
E/N).
This is because MSE depends on the number of users, for
comparison purposes, we first average the MSE to normalize
the influence of user count. In addition, since MSE is square
error, we take the square root in order to make it comparable
with absolute error, which roughly means how much deviation
percentage is the result from the exact value. Note that,
doing so does not change the optimal solutions in any of
our optimization problems. In addition, since LIP achieves a
relaxed privacy level than LDP, it is difficult to compare their
utilities under the same privacy level. Thus, we will compare
their optimal utilities under any given privacy budget ǫ. All the
simulations are done in Matlab (R2016a) on a Dell desktop
(OptiPlex 7040; CPU: Intel (R) Core (TM) i5-6500@ 3.2GHz;
RAM 8.0 GB; OS: windows 64bit).
A. Simulation Results on Synthetic Data
1) Benefit of Context-awareness: First we would like to
compare the utility-privacy tradeoffs between ǫ-LIP and ǫ-
LDP using the binary model, and the goal is to observe
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Fig. 5. The utility-privacy tradeoff comparison between prior-aware and prior-
free models (log scale for y-axis)
the advantage of our proposed context-aware notion versus
context-free notion of LDP. Intuitively, the utility gain of the
former can be attributed to two factors: 1) using the prior in
the MMSE estimator, which improves the accuracy compared
with estimators that do not use prior knowledge; 2) the privacy
guarantee of LIP is relaxed compared with LDP, by explicitly
modeling prior in the definition. As a result, less perturbation
is needed to satisfy the same privacy budget ǫ. The latter factor
is already proven in proposition 3. To decouple the influence of
the above two factors, we compare the utility-privacy tradeoff
of Opt-LIP with two other schemes: Opt-LDP (defined earlier),
as well as context-free LDP adopted in previous work [15].
The prior-unaware estimator used in [15] is denoted as Cˆ,
which treats Xi as instances rather than variables:
Cˆ =
∑N
i=1 Yi −Npi
1− 2pi , (41)
where pi =
eǫ
eǫ+1 as we discussed in section IV. This is an
unbiased estimator under the binary symmetric channel (BSC)
model. The MSE function of this estimator is:
E[(S − Cˆ)2] = V ar[Cˆ] = Npi(1− pi)
(1− 2pi)2 (42)
The comparison is shown in Fig. 5. The privacy budget ǫ
changes from 1 to 5 with a step of 0.5. For now we assume
that N users share the same global prior. We can see that, the
square root average MSE of “ǫ-Opt-LDP” is always smaller
than that of “context-free LDP” under any given ǫ. When
P1 = 0.5 (prior is uniformly distributed), the distance between
these two models is smaller; when the prior is more skewed,
advantage of the former is even enhanced. This validates
the benefit of the prior-aware estimator. On the other hand,
by comparing the curves of “ǫ-Opt-LDP” and “ǫ-Opt-LIP”
(using the same MMSE estimator), the error of Opt-LIP is
always smaller than that of Opt-LDP, and the gap between the
two models increases when P1 = 0.99. This result confirms
that our relaxed prior-aware privacy notion leads to increased
utility. When P1 = 0.99, users’ inputs are highly certain,
merely considering prior in the estimator can already result
in accurate aggregation. Thus advantage of the context-aware
ǫ-LIP is even enhanced.
2) Comparing Models in MIMO Settings: We now evaluate
the utility-privacy tradeoffs under the optimal solutions of LIP
and LDP models when the D has a large domain.
We first fix the users number as N = 500 and |D| = 5.
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Fig. 6. Utility-privacy tradeoff comparisons under MIMO model
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Fig. 7. Utility-privacy tradeoff comparison for the application of histogram
Without loss of generality, we assume that for each user, D =
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, with the prior of each value randomly generated.
The utility-privacy trade offs are shown in Fig.6(a). We can
see that the figure shows that the ǫ-MIMO-LIP performs better
than under the binary model, as the ǫ/2-MIMO-LIP provides
higher utility even than the ǫ-MIMO-LDP. This means the
advantage of LIP becomes more obvious with |D| increases.
We next compare in detail how the data domain affects
the LIP and LIP: Consider 500 users are in the system and
each of them has an input range varying from |D| = 2 to
|D| = 20. To explicitly illustrate the comparison of LIP and
LDP models with |D| increasing, we assume that each user’s
prior is uniformly distributed. We then fixed ǫ = 1, and
show the utility with different input ranges under ǫ = 1. In
Fig.6(b), we observe that when |D| is small, the ǫ-MIMO-LDP
model provides better utility than the ǫ/2-MIMO-LIP model.
However, as |D| increases, the ǫ/2-MIMO-LIP eventually
outperforms ǫ-MIMO-LDP. We can also see that both the LDP
and LIP models suffer from decreased utility when the input
range increases, but the LIP models decreases linearly with the
input range increasing while the LDP model decreases faster
than that.
3) Histogram: For the application of histogram, the defini-
tion of the total MSE is different from the MIMO case, as the
estimator is an expected vector. We compare the performance
of LIP and the LDP in two ways: (1) the LIP v.s. the context
aware LDP, in this case, the utility of LDP is measured by
the square root average MSE between the real value and the
prior-related estimated vector; (2) the LIP v.s. the context-free
LDP. To measure the utility of the context-free LDP, we adopt
the optimal unary encoding (OUE-LDP) protocol proposed in
[15]. Unary encoding is first mapping the input data into a
binary vector and perturb each bit independently, which is
proved to provide the highest utility among all the other LDP
protocols, as the binary encoding method reduces the amount
of increased error from a large domain. We fix the data domain
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Fig. 8. Utility-privacy tradeoff comparison when N users have different local priors, y-axis is square root average MSE:
√
E/N .
to |D| = 20 and range ǫ from 0 to 10. The MSE resulted by
the OUE-LDP in the application of histogram is n 4e
ǫ
(eǫ−1)2 .
The comparison is shown in Fig. 7. Observe that the tradeoff
curve of the ǫ-context-aware LDP is sandwiched between the
ǫ-LIP and the ǫ/2-LIP. The LDP with optimal unary encoding
results in very large MSE with small ǫ, when ǫ increasing, it
achieves increased utility than the context-aware LDP, but it
still sandwiched between the ǫ-LIP and the ǫ/2-LIP. It further
shows that the context-aware models are more applicable with
strong privacy protection.
4) Monte-Carlo Simulation: We further study the case
when each user has different local priors and use Monte-Carlo
Simulation to study the convergence of performance when N
increases. Fig. 8 shows the comparison among three models
described above as well as the model with CIP described in
section IV-D. We assume that each user’s prior probability
is sampled uniformly at random from [0, 1]. We create three
datasets with N = 5, 500 and 50000, each of which contains
randomly generated binary data according to their priors. For
each dataset, in the localized cases, we assume that each user
publishes Yi using the LIP models or the LDP models and
the curator aggregates data using corresponding estimators
discussed above. The error is measured by the square root
of the averaged error over all users. In the centralized case,
as the close form of the optimal parameters are difficult to
find, we use build in optimization tools to find the parameters
and derive the error. We ran each simulation 10000 times and
average the errors, which are shown in Fig.8. Note that when
N = 5, curves of ǫ/2-Opt-LIP and ǫ-Opt-LDP cross over.
This is because some users’ P i1 values are far from 0.5, which
makes the MSE of ǫ/2-Opt-LIP smaller than that of ǫ-Opt-
LDP for smaller ǫ. As N becomes larger, we can see that ǫ-
Opt-LIP always provides higher utility than ǫ-Opt-LDP model
under any ǫ. We also observe that the curve of ǫ-Opt-LDP is
almost sandwiched between the ones of ǫ/2-Opt-LIP and ǫ-
Opt-LIP. In comparison with the centralized information pri-
vacy, we can observe that the centralized information privacy
always provide increased utility than the localized models.
B. Simulation with Real-world Datasets
1) Website Popularity Statistics: The first comparison is
run using the dataset of Karosak which is a collection of
anonymized click-stream data of a hungarian on-line news
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Fig. 9. Utility-privacy tradeoff comparisons using real world data
portal. There are around 8 million click events for 41,270
different pages. In this data set, each row stands for a click-
stream for a website in different time slots. Our goal is to
estimate the frequency of popular websites (with a total click
over 15,000). We treat each website as a user, thus Xi = 1
if the total clicks of website i is above 15,000; otherwise,
Xi = 0. Since no historical data is available, we regard it as
the first special case in which users have a global prior.
In Fig. 9(a), we can see that ǫ-Opt-LDP results in larger
square root average MSE than ǫ-Opt-LIP. For some smaller
value of ǫ, ǫ/2-Opt-LIP performs better than ǫ-Opt-LDP. This
is because the popular websites are rare, thus the global prior
is relative small. Again, this result confirms that, the more
specific the prior is, the more beneficial is LIP than LDP.
2) Location Check-In Dataset: We then compare the per-
formance of different models with another real-world dataset
Gowalla, which is a social networking application where users
share their locations by checking-in. There are 6,442,892 users
in this dataset. For each user, a trace of his/her check-in
locations are recorded. For this dataset, we wish to estimate
a histogram of users’ last check-in location. We first divide
the area into 36 × 36 districts. We then map each user’s
locations into districts. Each user’s past check-in locations
are used for calculating a global prior of the last check-in
location for all the users. As studied in section. IV-C, for
each user, the last check-in location is perturbed according
to a MIMO-LIP (LDP) channel and a random vector is used
for the adversary to estimate the histogram. The results are
shown in Fig. 9(b), where similar trends can be observed as in
the empirical results. Note that comparing with the theoretical
results from Fig. 7, the advantage of LIP is even more clear in
Fig. 9(b), that is because the theoretical analysis uses data from
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a domain with |D| = 20. On the other hand, in the dataset of
Gowalla, the input data is from a domain with |D| = 36× 36,
even though many of the districts has o users checking-in,
which results in zero priors for these districts. Based on the
MIMO perturbation mechanism, for those districts with 0
prior, the system will also never output those districts, as a
result, the data domain is equivalent to a much decreased one.
Nevertheless, the effective domain size is |D| = 83, which is
much larger than 20. As we discussed, when domain size is
large, the advantage of LIP is enhanced.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, the notion of localized information privacy
is proposed. As a context-aware privacy notion, it provides
relaxed privacy guarantee than LDP by introducing prior
knowledge in the privacy definition while achieving increased
utility. Combined with an MMSE estimator which also lever-
ages prior knowledge, larger gains in utility can be obtained.
We studied the utility-privacy tradeoff of our proposed LIP
notion and the traditional LDP notion under different both
binary perturbation model and multiple-input and multiple-
output perturbation model. In the binary model, we show that
our ǫ-LIP always outperform ǫ-LDP for any given privacy
budget ǫ. The advantage is more enhanced when the prior
distribution is more skewed (even ǫ/2-LIP with a stronger
privacy guarantee than ǫ-LDP is better than the latter for
small ǫ values). In the MIMO model, we show that when
the input data has a larger range, both the LIP mechanisms
and LDP mechanism suffer decreased utility. However, as
the input range increasing, the decreased amount of the LIP
mechanism is less than that of the LDP mechanism. Which
means the context-aware privacy notion is more applicable
than the context-free privacy notion in the MIMO case.
For future work, we will extend our work to handle more
general models. For example, we will consider an adversary
that has less accurate/complete prior knowledge than users,
and also understand the impact of user correlations. We will
also study the optimality of the perturbation model.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. 1) Step 1
Notice that P i1 is a constant, thus the optimization
problem is equivalent to maximize:
Li(qi0, q
i
1) =
(λi0 − qi1)2
λi0λ
i
1
=
(λi1q
i
1 − λi0(1− qi1))2
λi0λ
i
1
.
(43)
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In order to test the monotoncity of Li(qi0, q
i
1), taking
partial derivative on it.
∂Li(qi0, q
i
1)
∂qi0
=(1− qi1)2(
λi0
λi1
)′ + qi1
2
(
λi1
λi0
)′ + [−2qi1(1− qi1)]′
=(1− qi1)2(
P i1 − 1
λi1
2 ) + q
i
1
2
(
1 − P i1
λi0
2 )
=(1− P i1)(
(λi1q
i
1)
2 − [λi0(1− qi1)]2
λi1
2
λi0
2 )
=(1− P i1)
[λi1q
i
1 + λ
i
0(1 − qi1)][λi1qi1 − λi0(1− qi1)]
λi1
2
λi0
2
=(1− P i1)2
[λi1q
i
1 + λ
i
0(1− qi1)](qi1 + qi0 − 1)
λi1
2
λi0
2 .
(44)
In (45), noticed that
∂Li(q
i
0
,qi
1
)
∂qi
0
≥ 0 when qi1+qi0−1 ≥ 0;
∂Li(q
i
0
,qi
1
)
∂qi
0
< 0 when qi1+q
i
0−1 < 0. Which means given
any value of qi1, L
i(qi0, q
i
1) is monotonically decreasing
with qi0 from 0 to 1− qi1.
By the same way, when qi0 is fixed, Li(q
i
0, q
i
1) is mono-
tonically decreasing with qi1 from 0 to 1− qi0.
2) Step 2
To test the symmetry of Li(q
i
0, q
i
1), take q
i′
0 = 1 − qi0,
qi
′
1 = 1− qi1.
Li(qi
′
0 , q
i′
1 ) =
(1− P i1)2(1− qi0 − qi1)2
λi1λ
i
0
=Li(qi0, q
i
1).
Thus, Li(qi0, q
i
1) is symmetric about (0.5, 0.5), which
means for every point (qi0, q
i
1) on the left of q
i
0+q
i
1 = 1,
we can find a point on the right side of qi0 + q
i
1 = 1
that result in a same Li(qi0, q
i
1) value.
In terms of the constraints, first derive F i1(q
i
0, q
i
1),
F i2(q
i
0, q
i
1), F
i
3(q
i
0, q
i
1), F
i
4(q
i
0, q
i
1) as:
F i1(q
i
0, q
i
1) =
Pr(X = 1)
Pr(X = 1|Y = 0) =
λi0
qi1
;
F i2(q
i
0, q
i
1) =
Pr(X = 1)
Pr(X = 1|Y = 1) =
λi1
1− qi1
;
F i3(q
i
0, q
i
1) =
Pr(X = 0)
Pr(X = 0|Y = 0) =
λi0
1− qi0
;
F i4(q
i
0, q
i
1) =
Pr(X = 0)
Pr(X = 0|Y = 1) =
λi1
qi0
.
(45)
if taking qi
′
0 = 1 − qi0, qi
′
1 = 1 − qi1 into F i1(qi0, qi1),
F i2(q
i
0, q
i
1), F
i
3(q
i
0, q
i
1) and F
i
4(q
i
0, q
i
1):
F i1(q
i′
0 , q
i′
1 ) =
λi1
1− qi1
= F i2(q
i
0, q
i
1),
F i2(q
i′
0 , q
i′
1 ) =
λi0
qi1
= F i1(q
i
0, q
i
1),
F i3(q
i′
0 , q
i′
1 ) =
λi1
qi0
= F i4(q
i
0, q
i
1),
F i4(q
i′
0 , q
i′
1 ) =
λi0
1− qi0
= F i1(q
i
0, q
i
1).
As a result, the four constraints functions are sym-
metric about point (0.5, 0.5). Assume that F ij (q
i
0, q
i
1),
j = 1, 2, 3, 4 form a feasible region Ti for (qi0, qi1),
thus for any point in this region, another point can be
found on the other side of qi0 + q
i
1 = 1 also in Ti. Now
(qi∗0 , q
i∗
1 ) ∈ Ti = Ti ∩ {qi0 + qi1 ≤ 1}.
Fig. ?? illustrates the function of Li(q
i
0, q
i
1) and feasible
region Ri on the plane of qi0, qi1, curves in the figure is
the contour line of Li(q
i
0, q
i
1), while the shadow region
is the feasible region of Ti when ǫ is fixed.
3) Step 3
Since
F i1 − F i2 =P i1 +
(1− P i1)(1− qi0)
qi1
− (P i1 +
(1 − P i1)qi0
1− qi1
)
=(1− P i1)
1− qi0 − qi1
qi1(1− qi1)
and
F i4 − F i3 =1− P i1 +
P i1(1− qi1)
qi0
− (1− P i1 +
P i1q
i
1
1− qi0
)
=(1− P i1)
1− qi0 − qi1
qi1(1− qi1)
,
for any point (qi0, q
i
1) ∈ Ti, there is F i1 ≥ F i2 and
F i4 ≥ F i3
Ti = {F i1 ≤ eǫ} ∩ {e−ǫ ≤ F i2} ∩ {e−ǫ ≤ F i3}
∩ {F i4 ≤ eǫ} ∩ {qi0 + qi1 ≤ 1}
(46)
From (46), assume that qi0 is fixed to be q0, then
qi1 ≥


(1−P i
1
)(1−q0)
eǫ−P i
1
if q0 ≥ P i1/eǫ
1− (eǫ+P i1−1)(q0)
P i
1
if q0 < P
i
1/e
ǫ.
Since Li(qi0, q
i
1) is monotonically decreasing with q
i
0 and
qi1 in Ti, For any qi0 in Ti, its according optimal qi∗1 is
the smallest value s.t. (qi0, q
i∗
1 ) is in Ti. It is the same
with qi∗0 . On the other hand, F
i
1 , F
i
2 , F
i
3 , F
i
4 are all liner,
their bounds value can be achieved when they are equal
to their constraints values eǫ or e−ǫ. As a result,
(qi∗0 , q
i∗
1 ) ∈
{
{F i1 = eǫ} if q0 ≥ P i1/eǫ
{F i4 = eǫ} if q0 < P i1/eǫ.
4) Step 4
To find the minimal value of Li(qi0, q
i
1), where (q
i
0, q
i
1) ∈
Ti, the last thing we need to do is to test its monotocity
of Li(qi0, q
i
1) given F
i
1 = e
ǫ or F i4 = e
ǫ.
LiF i
1
=eǫ(q
i
0, q
i
1) =
(1− P i1)2(qi0 + qi1 − 1)2
λi0λ
i
1
=
[(1− P i1)(eǫ − 1)qi1]2
λi0λ
i
1
,
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To find the minimal value, taking derivative over Li
F i
1
=eǫ
∂Li
F i
1
=eǫ
(qi0, q
i
1)
∂qi1
=(1 − P i1)2(eǫ − 1)2(
qi1
2
λi0λ
i
1
)′
=(1 − P i1)2(eǫ − 1)2qi1
λi1(λ
i
0 − P i1qi1) + λi0λi1 + P i1qi1λi0
(λi0λ
i
1)
2
Which is obviously greater than 0, similarly, when F i4 =
eǫ is given:
∂Li
F i
4
=eǫ
(qi0, q
i
1)
∂qi0
=P i1
2
(eǫ − 1)2( q
i
0
2
λi0λ
i
1
)′
=P i1
2
(eǫ − 1)2qi0
λi0(λ
i
1 − (1− P i1)qi0) + λi1(1− P i1)qi0
(λi0λ
i
1)
2
Which is also greater then 0. Noticed that, when qi0 ≤
P i
1
eǫ , optimal point is (q
i∗
0 , q
i∗
1 ) = (
P i
1
eǫ ,
1−P i
1
eǫ ), when q
i
0 >
P i
1
eǫ , the optimal point is also (q
i∗
0 , q
i∗
1 ) = (
P i
1
eǫ ,
1−P i
1
eǫ ).
Thus the global optimal solution is (
P i
1
eǫ ,
1−P i
1
eǫ ).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. Notice that V ar[Xi] is a non-negative constant, thus
minizing MSE is equivalent to maximize V ar[Xˆi].
Lemma 1. Regardless of the privacy constraints, one set of
solutions of qi that result in the minimal value of V ar[Xˆi] is
qink = λ
i
k , ∀n, k ∈ 1, 2, 3...d; one set of solutions of qi that
result in the maximal value of V ar[Xˆi] is all q
i
kjs are from
the set of {0, 1}, and for any n 6= m, qinj and qimj can not be
1 simultaneously.
Proof. Obviously, minimized solution:
Consider a set of parameters: qimin, when q
i
nk = λ
i
k,
∀n, k ∈ 1, 2, 3...d, V ar[Xˆi] = 0, as V ar[Xˆi] ≥ 0, thus
qink = λ
i
k results in a minimal value of V ar[Xˆi].
On the other hand, maximized solution: Consider a set of
parameters: qimax, assume that for all n ∈ 1, 2...d, there’s a
k ∈ 1, 2, ..., d, such that qink = 1 and qinl = 0 for all l 6= k
and for different n, k is different, thus λik = P
i
n
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
d∑
k=1
amanP
i
mP
i
nq
i
mk(
qink
λik
− 1)
=
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
anamP
i
nP
i
mq
i
mk(
qink
P in
− 1)
=
d∑
n=1
a2nP
i
n(1 − P in)−
d∑
n=1
d∑
m 6=n
anamP
i
nP
i
m
=V ar[Xi]
(47)
Notice that MSEi ≥ 0, V ar[Xi] ≥ V ar[Xˆi]. Thus qmini is
a maximum when for all n ∈ 1, 2, ..., d, qink = 1 and qinl = 0
for all l 6= k.
When ǫ = 0, the mechanism satisfies strongest privacy
guarantee and
λik
qi
jk
= 1. We know that when qink = λ
i
k , the
mechanism achieves minimized utility.
We now develop monotocity of the region between mini-
mum and maximum with the following lemma:
Lemma 2. The sets of solutions in the form in lemma.1 that
result in the maximum and minimum of V ar[Xˆi] are unique.
On the other hand, V ar[Xˆi] is monotonically increasing when
qilk > λ
i
k; V ar[Xˆi] is monotonically decreasing when q
i
lk <
λik
Proof. Taking derivative over qilk, where l, k ∈ 1, 2..., d:
∂V ar[Xˆi]
∂qilk
=
1
(λik)
2
[alλ
i
k(2
d∑
m=1
(amq
i
mk − ajλik))− P il (
d∑
m=1
a2m(q
i
mk)
2
− 2
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
amanq
i
mkq
i
nk]
=
1
(λik)
2
[alλ
i
k(2
d∑
m=1
(amq
i
mk − ajλik))− P il (
d∑
m=1
amq
i
mk)
2]
=
alq
i
lk(
∑d
m 6=l amq
i
mk)(1 − P ik)(qilk − λik)
λik
.
(48)
From (48), we can see that the station point of qilk is λ
i
k,
which we know is the minimal value and V ar[Xˆi] is mono-
tonically increasing when qilk > λ
i
k; V ar[Xˆi] is monotonically
decreasing when qilk < λ
i
k. As a result, without considering the
privacy constraints, the optimal solutions of each qimn is either
0 or 1. We first show that the maximum value of V ar[Xˆi] can
only be achieved by the solutions discussed above.
We take one set of optimal solution as an examples, other
solutions follow the same idea, the set of optimal solution
is: qikk = 1 for any k ∈ 1, 2, ..., d, and qikj = 0 for any
j ∈ 1, 2, ..., d. Know we assume that there is an subset of
index 1 to n, s.t: qillk 6= 1 6= 0, for any k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
By the monotocity, we know that, regardless the privacy
constraint and the total probability constraints, V ar[Xˆi] with
qilk 6= 1 6= 0 and is less than V ar[Xˆ ′i] with qilk = 1, for any
k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Compare with the two solutions, we have:
V ar[Xi]− V ar[Xˆ ′i ]
=
n∑
k=1
a2l P
i
l (
P il
P il + P
i
k
) +
n∑
k=1
a2kP
i
k(
P ik
P il + P
i
k
)
+
d∑
m/∈{1,2,...,n}
alP
i
l amP
i
m − 2
n∑
k=1
alak
P il P
i
k
P il + P
i
k
=
n∑
k=1
(alP
i
l − akP ik)2
P il + P
i
k
+
d∑
m/∈{1,2,...,n}
alP
i
l amP
i
m
> 0
(49)
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Thus the optimal solution is: only one of the qikk can be
one, other qikjs are all zeros.
Now, we know that the optimal solution for the miniming
MSE problem with ǫ growing is from the minimal value to
its maximal value. As a result of the monotocity property,
the optimal solution (with privacy constraints) lies on the
boundaries of the constraints: e−ǫ =
λik
qi
jk
, or
λik
qi
jk
= eǫ as well
as the constraints: 0 ≤ qijk;
∑d
n=1 q
i
jn = 1;, ∀j, k ∈ 1, 2, ..., d.
Based on the solutions which result in the maximum and
minimum of V ar[Xˆi]. We know that one of the probabilities
of qim1, q
i
m2, ..., q
i
md, ∀m approaches 1 and others approaches
0. As we can randomly permute the sequence of Yi, there
are d! feasible solutions. We now consider the case in which
qikks approach 1 for all k ∈ 1, 2, ..., d, and other qikjs are
approaching 0, where j 6= k. For the qikks which approach 1,
the upper bounds is restricted, and for qikjs which approach
0, the lower bounds are mounted. Considering the privacy
constraints, we know the upper of qikk is λ
i
k/e
−ǫ and the lower
bound of qikj is λ
i
k/e
ǫ. As qikk +
∑d
j=1,j 6=k q
i
kj = 1, for all js
qikjs are approaching boundaries simultaneously, as a result,
they may not reach the boundaries at the same time.
We now discuss whether lower bounds or upper bounds are
reached first.
Lemma 3. The parameters that decrease when ǫ grows reach
the boundary first.
Proof. When lower bounds are reached, qij,k =
λk
eǫ for all
j, k ∈ 1, 2, 3, ..., d, j 6= k. Thus qikk = 1− (1− P ik)/eǫ.
λik =
d∑
j 6=k
P ik
eǫ
+ P ik(1 −
(1− P ik)
eǫ
)
=(1− P ik)
P ik
eǫ
+ P ik(1−
(1− P ik)
eǫ
)
=P ik
(50)
We can check whether qikks are in the feasible region:
λik
qikk
− e−ǫ = e
ǫP ik
eǫ + P ik − 1
− e−ǫ
=
1− e−ǫ + P ik(eǫ − e−ǫ)
eǫ + P ik − 1
≥ 0
(51)
eǫ − λ
i
k
qikk
=eǫ − e
ǫP ik
eǫ + P ik − 1
=
eǫ(eǫ − 1)
eǫ + P ik − 1
≥ 0
(52)
So, we know that when qikjs reach the lower bound, q
i
kk is still
in the feasible region, it’s easy to check that when qikk reaches
the upper bound, qikjs do not satisfies the privacy constraints.
As a result, one optimal solution is: qikj = P
i
j/e
ǫ for all
k, j ∈ 1, 2, 3...d and j 6= k; qikk = 1 − (1 − P ik)/eǫ for all
k ∈ 1, 2, 3...d. We can randomly permute the sequence of Yi,
thus there are d! optimal solutions.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM.4
Proof. We know the optimal solution of the parameters of
any input ak are in the form of: q
i
kk is approaching to 1 while
other qikjs are approaching to 0 so that each input value can be
inferred by a particular output. For example, given Y i = ak,
we can probably infer that X i is also ak and the confidence
increases with ǫ.
• Assume that f < d, intuitively, this will achieve de-
creased utility because at least one of input values
with index k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d} can not find an parameter
that approaches to 1, as a result, inputs with indexed
{f + 1, f + 2, ..., d} can not be inferred by any outputs.
Mathematically, as the d is fixed, V ar(X) is also fixed.
denote V ar(Xˆi) as the variance of the estimator with
d = f and V ar(Xˆ ′i) as the variance of the estimator
with d > f . recall that
Xˆi =
d∑
j=1
d∑
k=1
ajPr(Xi = aj|Yi = ak)1ik, (53)
derive the Xˆ ′i:
Xˆ ′i =
d∑
j=1
f∑
k=1
ajPr(Xi = aj |Yi = ak)1ik, (54)
First assume that for each j ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, k ∈
{1, 2, ..., f}, the parameters of Xˆi and Xˆ ′i are identical.
We know that for each j ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., f},
ajPr(Xi = aj |Yi = ak) ≥ 0, thus V ar(Xˆ ′i) is
monotonically increasing with f .
Notice that the parameters of Xˆi and Xˆ ′i can not be
identical as for at least one j, qikj will increase for
k ∈ {f + 1, f + 2, ..., d}, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., f}. However,
the increase of these values will make each Pr(Xi =
ak|Yi = aj) smaller, thus Pr(Xi = ak|Yi = aj) >
Pr(X ′i = ak|Y ′i = aj).
As a result: V ar(Xi) > V ar(X
′
i).
• Assume that d < f , this case can be viewed as a special
case of the general model with P id+1 = P
i
d+2 = ... =
P if . Thus the optimal solutions is straightforward: q
i
kk =
1 − (1 − P ik)/eǫ, qikj = P ij/eǫ for k, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., d};
qikj = 0, for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, j ∈ {d + 1, d + 2, ..., f}.
As a result, the optimal solution is equivalent to the case
of the general model with d = f .
In summary, the optimal range of output is f = d.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Proof. The parameter-related term in (31) can be further
expressed as:
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=
N∑
i=1
d∑
k=1
{V ar(
d∑
j=1
Pr(Xi = ak|Yi = aj)1{Yi=aj})}
=
N∑
i=1
d∑
k=1
{(
d∑
j=1
Pr(Xi = ak|Yi = aj)2V ar(1{Yi=aj}))
+
d∑
j=1
d∑
l 6=j
Pr(Xi = ak|Yi = aj)Pr(Xi = ak|Yi = al)
· Cov(1{Yi=aj} · 1{Yi=al})}
=
N∑
i=1
d∑
k=1
{[
d∑
j=1
(qikjP
i
k)
2
λij
(1− λij)−
d∑
j=1
d∑
l 6=j
qikjq
i
kl(P
i
k)
2]}
=
N∑
i=1
d∑
k=1
{(P ik)2
d∑
j=1
qikj(
qikj
λij
− 1)}
(55)
Comparing with the parameter-related term in the MSE for-
mulation of the mimo model:
N∑
i=1
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
d∑
j=1
amanP
i
mP
i
nq
i
mj(
qinj
λij
− 1). (56)
when each m = n = k, and aj = 1 for j ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, (56)
becomes:
N∑
i=1
d∑
k=1
d∑
j=1
(P ik)
2qikj(
qikj
λik
−1) =
N∑
i=1
d∑
k=1
(P ik)
2
d∑
j=1
qikj(
qikj
λik
−1).
(57)
Notice that (57) is the same with the parameter-related term
in and we can consider aj = 1, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, m = n =
k as a special case of (55); On the other hand, these two
minimization problem has the same privacy constraints. Thus
their optimal solutions are identical.
